نظام التجارة كرد

نظام التجارة كرد
وقد أنشأت فينرا نظام ترحيل مراجعة الطلبات (أواتس)، كدليل تدقيق متكامل من النظام، واقتباس، والمعلومات التجارية لجميع الأسهم نمس والأوراق المالية أوتك. يستخدم فينرا هذا النظام درب التدقيق لإعادة الأحداث في دورة حياة أوامر ومراقبة أكثر تماما الممارسات التجارية للشركات الأعضاء. وبموجب قواعد فينرا 7410 - 7470، يتعين على الشركات الأعضاء في فينرا تطوير وسيلة للقبض الإلكتروني والإبلاغ عن عناصر البيانات المحددة لشركة أواتس المتعلقة بمعالجة الطلبات أو تنفيذها، بما في ذلك تسجيل جميع أوقات هذه الأحداث في الساعات والدقائق والثواني، ومزامنة ساعات عملهم. تمت الموافقة على هذه القواعد من قبل المجلس الأعلى للتعليم في 6 مارس 1998.
مكتب المساعدة في أواتس في فينرا هو المصدر الرئيسي للمعلومات حول أواتس. ويتاح الدعم التكنولوجي من الساعة 00/8 إلى الساعة 00/8 من يوم السبت. ويتاح الدعم التجاري من الساعة 00/8 إلى الساعة 00/18. من الاثنين وحتى الجمعة.
الاتصال مكتب المساعدة أواتس فينرا ل.
يرجى تقديم اسمك وعنوانك واسم الشركة ورقم وسيط الشركة (إن وجد) ورقم الهاتف عند الاتصال بمكتب مساعدة أواتس في فينرا عن طريق الهاتف أو الفاكس أو البريد الإلكتروني.

التقارير التجارية ومحرك الامتثال (تريس)
محرك التقارير والامتثال التجاري هو السيارة المتقدمة فينرا التي تسهل الإبلاغ الإلزامي من المعاملات السوق الثانوية دون وصفة طبية في الأوراق المالية المؤهلة ذات الدخل الثابت.
ويتعهد جميع الوسطاء الذين هم من الشركات الأعضاء في فينرا بالإبلاغ عن المعاملات في سندات الشركات إلى تريس بموجب مجموعة من القواعد المعتمدة من هيئة الأوراق المالية والبورصات.
إند - تريس - الروابط.
تتبع تنبيهات الخدمة، والتغييرات على الوثائق وترقيات النظام.
تحميل أدلة المستخدم ومواصفات أبي لمختلف نظم الإبلاغ تريس.
العثور على إجابات للأسئلة الشائعة بشأن تريس.
توضح قاعدة فينرا رول 7730 الرسوم المطلوبة لاستخدام تريس.
تحميل جداول البيانات، والبحوث المستقلة و تريس كتاب الحقائق.
وتساعد بطاقات تقرير تريس الشركات على مراقبة التزاماتها المتعلقة بتقديم التقارير.
قم بتنزيل اتفاقية مشاركة فينرا (فبا) ونماذج الإفراج والاتفاقيات القانونية الأخرى المتعلقة ب تريس.
اعتبارا من 10 يوليو 2017، يجب على الشركات الأعضاء الإبلاغ عن المعاملات المنفذة في الأوراق المالية الخزينة ل تريس.
تريس الإخطارات.
اشترك لتلقي رسائل بريد إلكتروني دورية بخصوص:
نظام تحديثات نظام تحديثات المخطط انقطاع الأحداث الهامة الأخرى.

نظام التجارة كرد
اللغات الأخرى المتاحة: لا شيء.
بروكسل، 16 تموز / يوليه 2018.
متطلبات رأس المال - كرد إيف / كر - أسئلة وأجوبة.
لماذا كان من الضروري مراجعة توجيه متطلبات رأس المال؟
وتستند الحزمة التي اعتمدها المجلس والبرلمان ونشرت في الجريدة الرسمية في 27 حزيران / يونيه 2018 إلى الدروس المستفادة من الأزمة الأخيرة التي أظهرت أن الخسائر في القطاع المالي يمكن أن تكون كبيرة للغاية عندما يسبق الانكماش فترة من الائتمان المفرط نمو. وكشفت الأزمة المالية عن أوجه ضعف في تنظيم النظام المصرفي والإشراف عليه على الصعيدين الأوروبي والعالمي. ودخلت المؤسسات الأزمة برأسمال عدم كفاية الكمية والنوعية، ومن أجل الحفاظ على الاستقرار المالي، كان على الحكومات أن تقدم دعما غير مسبوق للقطاع المصرفي في العديد من البلدان '1'.
ويتمثل الهدف الشامل للقواعد الجديدة في تعزيز قدرة القطاع المصرفي في الاتحاد الأوروبي على الصمود بحيث يكون في وضع أفضل لاستيعاب الصدمات الاقتصادية مع ضمان استمرار المصارف في تمويل النشاط الاقتصادي والنمو.
ما هي الدروس التي تعلمناها من الأزمة؟
أولا وقبل كل شيء، كشفت الأزمة ضرورة مطلقة لإنفاذ تعاون السلطات النقدية والمالية والإشرافية في جميع أنحاء العالم. وقد لوحظت التطورات عبر الحدود متأخرة جدا، وكان من الصعب جدا تحليل الآثار العابرة للحدود.
وثانيا، يبدو أن بعض المؤسسات في النظام المالي تتسم بالمرونة وجاهزة لاستيعاب صدمات سوقية هائلة أيضا. ويبدو أن مؤسسات أخرى، حتى مع وجود مستويات رأسمالية مماثلة، غير قادرة على حماية نفسها. ووجدت الفروق الحاسمة بين الاثنين في: جودة ومستوى قاعدة رأس المال، وتوافر قاعدة رأس المال، وإدارة السيولة وفعالية حوكمة الشركات الداخلية. وقد بررت هذه الدروس تعديل اتفاق بازل، وبالتالي استبدال كرد بإطار تنظيمي جديد بما في ذلك اللائحة (2) (كر) والتوجيه (إي) (كرد إيف).
وثالثا، يبدو أن إخفاقات المجموعات المالية الدولية عبر الحدود يمثل تحديا لا يمكن التغلب عليه بالنسبة للسلطات المسؤولة على الصعيد الوطني؛ ونتيجة لذلك، احتاجت عدة بنوك إلى التدخل من قبل الدولة من أجل البقاء واقفا على قدميه. ومن شأن المعرفة التي كان يمكن أن تحلها المصارف، وأيضا في سياق عابر للحدود، أن تغير ميزان القوى بين السلطات العامة والمصارف، وأن يكون لدى البلدان الأولى أدوات أكثر تحت تصرفها من الأموال العامة وخيار الإنقاذ فحسب، وهذه الأخيرة ليست قادرة على التمتع أفضل من جميع العالمين: خصخصة المكاسب، وخلق الخسائر الاجتماعية. ومن شأن ذلك أن يؤثر على قدرة البنك على تحمل المخاطر. وهذا يبرر الاقتراح التشريعي الذي قدمته اللجنة بشأن استرداد الأموال وحلها في 6 حزيران / يونيه 2018 (إب / 12/570). وهذا ما يفسر أيضا أنه تم، خلال المفاوضات، بناء على مبادرة من البرلمان الأوروبي، تعزيز القواعد المتعلقة بالأجور.
لماذا لم تتوقف القواعد القائمة (بما في ذلك بازل 1 / بازل 2) عن حدوث الأزمة؟
ويمثل إطار رأس المال المصرفي الحالي للاتحاد الأوروبي توجيه متطلبات رأس المال (كرد) الذي يتضمن التوجيهين 2006/48 / إيك و 2006/49 / إيك ويعكس مقترحات لجنة بازل لإطار عمل بازل 2 (بازل 2) . وهي تغطي مؤسسات الائتمان وشركات الاستثمار على حد سواء، وتنص على الحد الأدنى من الموارد المالية الخاصة التي يجب أن توفرها المصارف لتغطية المخاطر التي تتعرض لها.
وقد كشفت الأزمة المالية عن عدد من أوجه القصور في اتفاقية بازل الثانية واستلزمت مستويات غير مسبوقة من الدعم العام من أجل استعادة الثقة والاستقرار في النظام المالي. وقد تم تحديد أوجه القصور التالية في الإطار الحالي، وهي: رأس المال الذي لم يكن في الواقع ممتصا للخسارة، وفشل إدارة السيولة، وعدم كفاية إدارة المخاطر على نطاق المجموعة وعدم كفاية الحوكمة. وفي هذا الصدد، أعلن إعلان مجموعة العشرين الصادر في 2 نيسان / أبريل 2009 التزام الزعماء العالميين بمعالجة الأزمة بجهود متسقة دوليا من أجل تحسين نوعية ونوعية رأس المال في النظام المصرفي، وذلك من أجل احتواء تراكم الرافعة المالية، ووضع إطار لزيادة احتياطيات السيولة لدى المؤسسات المالية، وتنفيذ توصيات مجلس الاستقرار المالي للتخفيف من التأثر بالدورة الاقتصادية.
واستجابة للولاية التي منحتها مجموعة ال 20 في أيلول / سبتمبر 2009، اتفق فريق حكام المصرف المركزي ورؤساء هيئات الإشراف، وهي هيئة الرقابة التابعة للجنة بازل (انظر القسم 2 أدناه) على عدد من التدابير تعزيز تنظيم القطاع المصرفي. وقد أقرت هذه التدابير من قبل فسب وقادة مجموعة العشرين في مؤتمر قمة بيتسبرغ في 24-25 سبتمبر 2009.
في ديسمبر 2018، أصدرت لجنة بازل قواعد مفصلة للمعايير التنظيمية العالمية الجديدة بشأن كفاية رأس المال المصرفي والسيولة التي يشار إليها مجتمعة باسم بازل 3.
2. باسل الثالث، كرد الرابع و المستوى الدولي تشغيل الحقل.
ما هي لجنة بازل؟
وتتولى لجنة بازل للرقابة المصرفية مهمة وضع معايير دنيا دولية بشأن كفاية رأس المال المصرفي. ويقع مقرها في مقر بنك التسويات الدولية في بازل، سويسرا. ويأتي الاعضاء من الارجنتين واستراليا وبلجيكا والبرازيل وكندا والصين وفرنسا والمانيا وهونج كونج والهند واندونيسيا وايطاليا واليابان وكوريا ولوكسمبورج والمكسيك وهولندا وروسيا والمملكة العربية السعودية وسنغافورة وجنوب افريقيا ، إسبانيا، السويد، سويسرا، تركيا، المملكة المتحدة والولايات المتحدة. والمراقبون هم المفوضية الأوروبية، والسلطة المصرفية الأوروبية (إبا) والبنك المركزي الأوروبي.
ما هو "بازل 3"؟
وتضع اللجنة معايير الحد الأدنى لكفاية رأس المال المصرفي. وقد تطورت هذه على مر الزمن. بعد األزمة المالية، قامت لجنة بازل بمراجعة معايير كفاية رأس المال) انظر القسم 1 أعاله (. بازل 3 هو نتيجة هذا الاستعراض، مع العدد الثالث يأتي من كونه التكوين الثالث من هذه المعايير (إيف).
ما هو "بازل 3" الذي يقترح جعل البنوك أقوى؟
أفضل وأكثر رأس المال.
ويبدو أن هناك عدة بنوك لديها قاعدة رأسمالية في ميزانيتها العمومية تستوفي المعايير التنظيمية، التي تبين أنها غير متاحة دائما عند الحاجة لاستيعاب الخسائر. وقد حدت بعض العقود من استيعاب الخسائر أو لم تكن هناك ببساطة أصول سائلة تعكس رقم رأس المال في الميزانية العمومية.
وتحدد اتفاقية بازل 3 الآن معايير صارمة (v) يجب أن تلبيها أدوات الأموال الخاصة، وذلك لضمان تمكنها من استيعاب خسائر البنوك بشكل فعال أيضا في أوقات التوتر.
سيولة أكثر توازنا.
وتمثلت المشكلة الرئيسية في الافتقار إلى الأصول السائلة والتمويل السائل خلال الأزمة - المشار إليها باسم "السوق المجففة". يتطلب بازل 3 من المصرفيين إدارة تدفقاتهم النقدية وسيولةهم أكثر كثافة من ذي قبل، والتنبؤ بتدفقات السيولة الناتجة عن مطالبات الدائنين بشكل أفضل من ذي قبل، وأن يكونوا جاهزين لظروف السوق الشديدة من خالل توفر "نقد" كاف، على المدى القصير وعلى المدى الأطول.
الاستفادة من وقف العودة.
وفقط في حالة احتواء أوزان المخاطر المحسوبة في بازل 2 و 2.5 على أخطاء أو نماذج تحتوي على أخطاء أو يتم تطوير منتجات جديدة ولا يتم قياس أوزان المخاطر على وجه التحديد بعد، فإن آلية التوقف المؤقت التقليدية تحد من نمو إجمالي الميزانية العمومية مقارنة بالمتاحة الصناديق الخاصة. أقصى رافعة مالية من 12 تستخدم لتكون قاعدة الإبهام في الأيام التي البنوك لم تنظم بعد. اليوم، نظرا لتطور تحديد وزن المخاطر، فإن نسبة الرافعة المالية ستكون أداة فحص إضافية للمشرفين.
ولما كانت هذه الأداة جديدة بالنسبة للإطار الدولي، فقد اتفق على وجوب جمع البيانات والخبرات قبل إدخال نسبة فعالة للرافعة المالية كشرط ملزم في كل ولاية قضائية.
متطلبات رأس المال للمشتقات (مخاطر ائتمان الطرف المقابل)
كما يعزز بازل 3 متطلبات رأس المال الحالية لعمليات المشتقات المصرفية وما يسمى بالمخاطر االئتمانية للطرف المقابل التي تنبع منها. والمشتقات هي أداة تعتمد قيمتها على أداة أخرى تستند إليها. وتستخدم المشتقات لأسباب وجيهة في إدارة مخاطر المصارف، إلا أن الأزمة كشفت أن التعرضات والخسائر يمكن أن تكون جوهرية وأن استعراض المعاملة في الإطار الإشرافي له ما يبرره.
ويشمل اإلطار أيضا معالجة تعرضات البنوك لألطراف املقابلة املركزية. كب هي الكيان الذي يربط بين الطرفين المقابلين في معاملة، ليصبح المشتري لكل بائع والبائع لكل مشتر. والغرض الرئيسي من برنامج مراقبة الحاويات هو إدارة المخاطر التي قد تنشأ إذا لم يتمكن أحد الأطراف المقابلة من سداد المدفوعات المطلوبة عندما يكون ذلك مستحقا. الافتراضات على الصفقة.
(انظر القسم 10 أدناه)
هل تنفذ كرد إيف و كر بشكل كامل "بازل إي"؟
وقد ساهم الاتحاد الأوروبي بنشاط في تطوير رأس المال الجديد والسيولة والمعايير النفوذ في لجنة بازل للرقابة المصرفية، مع التأكد من أن يتم التعامل مع الخصائص والقضايا المصرفية الأوروبية الرئيسية بشكل مناسب.
ولذلك فإن القواعد الجديدة تحترم التوازن ومستوى الطموح في اتفاقية بازل 3. ومع ذلك، هناك سببان لا يمكن ببساطة نسخ / لصق اتفاقية بازل 3 في تشريع الاتحاد الأوروبي، وبالتالي، يجب تقييم التنفيذ المخلص لإطار بازل 3 مع مراعاة جوهر القواعد.
أولا، بازل 3 ليس قانونا. وهو أحدث تشكيلات لمجموعة متطورة من المعايير المتفق عليها دوليا التي وضعها المشرفون والبنوك المركزية. وهذا يجب أن يمر الآن بعملية رقابة ديموقراطية حيث يجري نقلها إلى قانون الاتحاد الأوروبي (والوطني). ويجب أن تتلاءم مع قوانين أو ترتيبات الاتحاد الأوروبي (والوطنية) القائمة.
وعالوة على ذلك، في حين تنطبق اتفاقيات كفاية رأس المال في بازل على "البنوك النشطة دوليا"، فإنها تطبق في االتحاد األوروبي على جميع البنوك) أكثر من 8،300 (باإلضافة إلى شركات االستثمار. وهذا النطاق الواسع ضروري في الاتحاد الأوروبي حيث يمكن للبنوك المرخص لها في إحدى الدول الأعضاء أن تقدم خدماتها عبر السوق الموحدة للاتحاد الأوروبي ومن ثم فهي أكثر من المرجح أن تشارك في الأعمال التجارية عبر الحدود. وعلاوة على ذلك، فإن تطبيق القواعد المتفق عليها دوليا فقط على مجموعة فرعية من المصارف الأوروبية كان من شأنه أن يخلق تشوهات تنافسية وإمكانية للمراجحة التنظيمية.
وقد أخذت هذه الظروف الخاصة بعين الاعتبار طوال العملية برمتها من أجل نقل بازل 3 إلى الإطار القانوني للاتحاد الأوروبي.
ما هي أوروبا المضافة إلى "بازل 3"؟
وكما هو موضح أعاله، فإن التغيير األساسي هو أنه عند تنفيذ اتفاقية بازل 3 داخل االتحاد األوروبي، ننتقل من نمط أحادي البعد من العالم حيث يكون لديك رأس مال فقط كمرجع احترازي، إلى التنظيم واإلشراف متعدد األبعاد، حيث لديك رأس المال والسيولة ونسبة الرافعة المالية - وهو أمر مهم، لأن هذا يغطي الميزانية العمومية للبنوك. وحتى داخل العاصمة، هناك تعريف أكثر نظافة وأهداف أكثر واقعية.
وباإلضافة إلى تنفيذ اتفاقية بازل 3، تقدم الحزمة عددا من التغييرات الهامة في اإلطار التنظيمي المصرفي.
في التوجيه:
الأجر. من أجل معالجة المخاطر المفرطة، تم تعزيز إطار المكافآت بشكل أكبر فيما يتعلق بمتطلبات العالقة بين المتغير) أو المكافأة (مكون المكافأة والمكون الثابت) أو الراتب (. لأداء اعتبارا من 1 يناير 2017 فصاعدا، لا يجوز أن يتجاوز المكون المتغير من إجمالي المكافأة 100٪ من المكون الثابت من إجمالي المكافآت للمخاطر المادية. بشكل استثنائي، وفي ظل ظروف معينة، يمكن للمساهم زيادة هذه النسبة القصوى إلى 200٪.
تعزيز الحوكمة: يعزز هذا النظام متطلبات ترتيبات حوكمة الشركات وعملياته ويضع قواعد جديدة تهدف إلى زيادة فعالية الرقابة على المخاطر من قبل المجالس وتحسين حالة وظيفة إدارة المخاطر وضمان مراقبة فعالة من قبل المشرفين على إدارة المخاطر.
تنوع. وينبغي أن يسهم التنوع في تكوين مجلس الإدارة في الإشراف الفعال على المخاطر من جانب المجالس، مما يوفر نطاقا أوسع من الآراء والرأي، وبالتالي يتجنب ظاهرة التفكير الجماعي. ولذلك، يقدم المركز عددا من المتطلبات، لا سيما فيما يتعلق بالتوازن بين الجنسين.
تعزيز الشفافية. ويعمل المركز على تحسين الشفافية فيما يتعلق بأنشطة المصارف وصناديق الاستثمار في مختلف البلدان، ولا سيما فيما يتعلق بالأرباح والضرائب والإعانات في مختلف الولايات القضائية. وهذا أمر ضروري لاستعادة ثقة مواطني الاتحاد الأوروبي في القطاع المالي.
المخزن المؤقت للمخاطر النظامية (انظر القسم 10 أدناه)
(انظر القسم 10 أدناه)
وأخيرا، تسعى القواعد الجديدة إلى الحد إلى أقصى حد ممكن من االعتماد من قبل مؤسسات االئتمان على التصنيفات االئتمانية الخارجية من خالل: أ (تتطلب أن تستند قرارات االستثمار في جميع البنوك ليس فقط على التصنيفات فحسب، بل أيضا على رأيها االئتماني الداخلي، و ب تقوم البنوك التي لديها عدد مادي من التعرضات في محفظة معينة بتطوير التصنيفات الداخلية لتلك المحفظة بدال من االعتماد على التصنيفات الخارجية لحساب متطلبات رأس المال لديها.
في اللائحة:
"كتاب القواعد الموحدة": لأول مرة يتم إنشاء مجموعة واحدة من القواعد الاحترازية المنسقة التي يجب على البنوك في جميع أنحاء الاتحاد الأوروبي احترامها. وقد دعا رؤساء دول وحكومات الاتحاد الاوروبى الى "كتاب قاعدة واحدة" فى اعقاب الازمة. ومن شأن ذلك أن يكفل التطبيق الموحد لاتفاقية بازل 3 في جميع الدول الأعضاء، وسيغلق الثغرات التنظيمية، ومن ثم سيسهم في زيادة فعالية أداء السوق الداخلية. وتزيل القواعد الجديدة عددا كبيرا من الخيارات والقيود الوطنية من اتفاقية حقوق الطفل، وتسمح للدول الأعضاء بتطبيق متطلبات أكثر صرامة فقط عندما تكون هذه الشروط مبررة بالظروف الوطنية (مثل العقارات)، التي تحتاج إليها لأسباب الاستقرار المالي أو بسبب المخاطر الخاصة بالبنك الملف الشخصي. انظر أيضا إب / 10/197.
كيف يمكن ضمان تحقيق مستوى دولي على الصعيد الدولي؟
والنظام المالي عالمي بطبيعته وهو ليس أقوى من أضعف روابطه. ولذلك فمن المهم أن تطبق جميع البلدان المعايير المصرفية الدولية، بما في ذلك اتفاقية بازل 3.
ویجري الاتحاد الأوروبي مناقشات مستمرة وبناءة مع شرکائھ الدولیین - وأبرزھا الولایات المتحدة - فیما یتعلق بتنفیذ اتفاقیات بازل بطریقة مناسبة وفي الوقت المناسب - وبشکل عام - بشأن القضایا التنظیمیة للخدمات المالیة عبر الحدود.
ما هو الجدول الزمني لتنفيذ اتفاقية حقوق الطفل وقاعدة بيانات التنمية الريفية وكيفية ارتباطها بالجداول الزمنية والتنفيذ في بلدان مجموعة العشرين الأخرى؟
وقد اتبع اقتراح اللجنة الأصلي الجدول الزمني المتفق عليه في لجنة بازل وفي إطار مجموعة العشرين: تطبيق التشريع الجديد اعتبارا من 1 يناير 2018، والتنفيذ الكامل في 1 يناير 2019، بما يتماشى مع الالتزامات الدولية. وبالنظر إلى المناقشات المفصلة التي دارت أثناء المداولات الثلاثية وأثرها على طول العملية التشريعية، نشر التشريع الجديد في 27 حزيران / يونيه 2018 ويدخل حيز النفاذ بالكامل في 17 تموز / يوليه 2018. ويتعين على المؤسسات تطبيق القواعد الجديدة اعتبارا من 1 كانون الثاني / يناير 2017 ( 6)، مع التنفيذ الكامل في 1 يناير 2019.
وحتى تاريخه، اعتمد قرابة نصف الوليات القسائية لأعساء جلنة بازل القواعد النهائية لتنفيذ) اأجزاء من (بازل 3. ومن المتوقع أن تعتمد السلطات القضائية المتبقية القواعد النهائية بحلول نهاية هذا العام.
ما الذي سيفعله الاتحاد الأوروبي إذا لم تقم السلطات القضائية الأخرى بتنفيذ اتفاقية بازل 3 بأمانة؟
ويهتم الاتحاد الأوروبي بزيادة قدرة نظامه المصرفي على الصمود. كما يهدف بازل 3 لتحقيق هذا الهدف، فمن حيث المبدأ في مصلحتنا لتنفيذه. وفي حين أن هناك دائما مخاطر على المدى القصير من المراجحة التنظيمية إذا ذهب أحد الاختصاصات إلى أبعد من ولايات قضائية أخرى، فإنه من المفيد على المدى الطويل أن يستفيد المشاركون في السوق من نظام مالي مستقر وآمن وسليم. ومع ذلك، قد تكون هناك مجالات يكون فيها مجال اللعب على الصعيد الدولي أكثر أهمية أيضا على المدى القصير (مثل العناصر الجديدة في اتفاقية بازل 3). ولذلك فإن اللجنة ترصد عن كثب التنفيذ الثابت والمخلص لأركان متطلبات بازل 3 (أي متطلبات رأس المال والسيولة والرافعة المالية) في جميع أنحاء العالم، وستحتاج إلى استخلاص جميع الاستنتاجات اللازمة في الوقت المناسب إذا لم تحذو ولايات رئيسية أخرى حذوها.
3 - هيكل الإطار التنظيمي الجديد.
لماذا هناك صكين قانونيين؟ لماذا أيضا التنظيم؟
ويقسم الإطار الجديد التوجيه الحالي لمتطلبات رأس المال (كرد) إلى صكين تشريعيين هما: التوجيه الذي يحكم الوصول إلى أنشطة أخذ الودائع، واللوائح التنظيمية التي تحدد المتطلبات الاحترازية التي يتعين على المؤسسات احترامها.
وفي حين يتعين على الدول الأعضاء أن تنقل التوجيه في القانون الوطني، فإن اللائحة قابلة للتطبيق مباشرة، مما يعني أنها تخلق قانونا يدخل حيز التنفيذ الفوري في جميع الدول الأعضاء بنفس الطريقة التي يتبع بها صك وطني، دون اتخاذ أي إجراء آخر من جانب السلطات الوطنية. وهذا يزيل المصادر الرئيسية للاختلافات الوطنية (التفسيرات المختلفة، الطلاء بالذهب). كما أنه يجعل العملية التنظيمية أسرع ويجعل من الاسهل للرد على ظروف السوق المتغيرة. فهو يزيد من الشفافية، حيث أن قاعدة واحدة كما هو مكتوب في اللائحة ستطبق في السوق الواحدة. وتخضع اللوائح التنظيمية لنفس عملية صنع القرار السياسي كتوجيه على المستوى الأوروبي، مما يضمن السيطرة الديمقراطية الكاملة.
وأخيرا وليس آخرا، يمثل هذا الاقتراح مراجعة شاملة للتشريعات المصرفية للاتحاد الأوروبي التي تطورت على مدى عقود. والنتيجة هي تشريع أكثر سهولة وقراءة.
ما الذي يذهب إليه الصك القانوني؟
وستبقى مجالات كرد الحالية حيث درجة وصفة طبية أقل وحيث الروابط مع القوانين الإدارية الوطنية ذات أهمية خاصة في شكل توجيه. ويتعلق ذلك بصفة خاصة بسلطات السلطات الوطنية ومسؤولياتها (مثل الإذن والإشراف وحفظ رأس المال والعقوبات)، والمتطلبات المتعلقة بإدارة المخاطر الداخلية التي تتشابك مع قانون الشركات الوطنية، فضلا عن أحكام حوكمة الشركات. وعلى النقيض من ذلك، فإن الأحكام التفصيلية والموجزة للغاية بشأن حساب متطلبات رأس المال تأخذ شكل لائحة.
(روابط قوية مع القانون الوطني، وأقل تقييدا)
(أحكام مفصلة وصفية للغاية إنشاء كتاب قاعدة واحدة)
الوصول إلى تناول / السعي من الأعمال التجارية.
ممارسة حرية التأسيس وحرية تنقل الخدمات.
مخاطر ائتمان الطرف المقابل.
ما هي المعايير الفنية التنظيمية والتنفيذية؟
إن المعايير التقنية الملزمة (أي المعايير التنظيمية والتنظيمية التقنية - بتس) هي أعمال قانونية تحدد جوانب معينة من نص تشريعي للاتحاد الأوروبي (التوجيه أو اللائحة) وتهدف إلى ضمان الاتساق في مجالات محددة. وتقوم اللجنة الأوروبية في نهاية المطاف باعتماد معاهدة بتس من خلال لوائح أو قرارات وهي ملزمة قانونا وتطبق مباشرة في جميع الدول الأعضاء.
ويكلف فريق العمل الأوروبي بإصدار عدد كبير من مشروع معاهدة بتس من أجل تنفيذ جوانب معينة من الاتفاقية الرابعة للجنة حقوق الطفل ولجنة حقوق الإنسان، على النحو المبين في النص التشريعي.
4. كتاب قواعد واحدة.
ما هو كتاب القاعدة الواحدة؟
وفي حزيران / يونيو 2009، دعا المجلس الأوروبي إلى إنشاء "كتاب أوروبي واحد للقواعد ينطبق على جميع المؤسسات المالية في السوق الواحدة". ويهدف كتاب قاعدة واحدة إلى توفير مجموعة واحدة من القواعد الاحترازية المنسقة التي يجب على المؤسسات في جميع أنحاء الاتحاد الأوروبي احترامها. ويتألف دليل القواعد الموحدة في مجال التنظيم المصرفي أيضا من معاهدة التعاون بشأن البراءات التي وضعتها الهيئة المصرفية الأوروبية، التي اعتمدتها المفوضية الأوروبية، وتطبق مباشرة في جميع الدول الأعضاء. وسيكفل دليل القواعد الموحدة التطبيق الموحد لاتفاقية بازل 3 في جميع الدول الأعضاء. وستغلق الثغرات التنظيمية وستسهم بالتالي في زيادة فعالية أداء السوق الموحدة. وتقترح اللجنة إزالة الخيارات والتحفظات الوطنية من لجنة التنمية المجتمعية وتحقيق المواءمة الكاملة من خلال السماح للدول الأعضاء بتطبيق متطلبات أكثر صرامة فقط عندما تكون هناك حاجة إلى ذلك لأسباب تتعلق بالاستقرار المالي أو بسبب وجود مخاطر محددة للمصرف.
لماذا هو "كتاب القاعدة الواحدة" مهم؟
واليوم، يستند التشريع المصرفي الأوروبي إلى توجيه مما يترك مجالا للاختلافات الكبيرة في القواعد الوطنية. وقد خلق ذلك خليط تنظيمي، مما أدى إلى عدم اليقين القانوني، وتمكين المؤسسات من استغلال الثغرات التنظيمية، وتشويه المنافسة، وجعل من الصعب على الشركات أن تعمل في السوق الواحدة.
وكان التوريق في صميم الأزمة المالية. وتناولت المعايير العالمية السابقة ومعايير االتحاد األوروبي) بازل 2، كرد I (بعض المخاطر حسب متطلبات رأس المال المحددة) بما في ذلك جميع مرافق السيولة (. ومع ذلك، فإن العديد من الدول الأعضاء لم تتبع، والاستفادة من الانسحاب الانتقالي. وفي سوق متكاملة تماما مثل التوريق، كان من السهل على المجموعات عبر الحدود إصدار سندات التوريق في الدول الأعضاء التي اختارت بدلا من الدول الأعضاء التي تطبق المعايير.
وعقب التجربة في التوريق في الأزمة المالية، أدخلت اللجنة الثانية قواعد منسقة لتشديد الشروط التي يمكن للمؤسسات بموجبها أن تستفيد من انخفاض متطلبات رأس المال بعد التوريق (بما في ذلك فكرة منسقة لنقل المخاطر بشكل كبير). غير أن العديد من الدول الأعضاء لم تنتقل إلى ذلك بحلول نهاية عام 2018 حسب الاقتضاء.
وقد أظهرت الأزمة المالية أن نماذج المخاطر الداخلية الموثوقة مهمة للمؤسسات لتوقع الإجهاد ورأس المال المناسب. ومع ذلك، تختلف متطلبات نماذج المخاطر الداخلية القائمة على التصنيفات، ومن ثم تنفيذها، من دولة عضو إلى أخرى. ونتيجة لذلك، تختلف متطلبات رأس المال للتعرضات المماثلة، مما يحتمل أن يؤدي إلى مجال اللعب غير المستقر والمراجحة التنظيمية.
إن التعريف الصارم لرأس المال هو عنصر أساسي في اتفاقية بازل 3. ومع ذلك، أظهرت التجربة مع كرد I أن الدول الأعضاء أدخلت اختلافات كبيرة عند نقل تعريف التوجيه إلى القانون الوطني. وفي بعض الحالات، واجهت اللجنة حالات نقل غير صحيحة واضطرت إلى فتح إجراءات الانتهاك، تستغرق سنوات عديدة، لإجبار هذه الدول الأعضاء على الامتثال للتوجيه.
وسيتناول كتاب قاعدة واحدة يستند إلى لائحة ما أوجه القصور هذه، وسيؤدي بالتالي إلى قطاع مصرفي أوروبي أكثر مرونة وشفافية وأكثر كفاءة:
قطاع مصرفي أوربي أكثر قدرة على الصمود: سيضمن دليل قواعد وحيد تطبيق الضمانات االحترازية حيثما أمكن ذلك في جميع أنحاء االتحاد األوروبي وال تقتصر على فرادى الدول األعضاء. وسلطت الأزمة الضوء على مدى ترابط اقتصادات الدول الأعضاء. الاتحاد الأوروبي هو الفضاء الاقتصادي المشترك. وما يؤثر على بلد ما يمكن أن يؤثر على الجميع. وليس من الواقعي الاعتقاد بأن العمل الانفرادي يجلب السلامة في هذا السياق. وإذا زادت دولة عضو من متطلبات رأس المال للمؤسسات المحلية، يمكن لمؤسسات الدول الأعضاء الأخرى مواصلة تقديم خدماتها بمتطلبات أقل - وبميزة تنافسية - ما لم تحذو بلدان أخرى حذوها. ويؤدي هذا أيضا إلى رفع مستوى المراجحة التنظيمية. ويمكن للمؤسسات التي تأثرت بمتطلبات رأس المال الأعلى أن تنتقل إلى دولة عضو أخرى وأن تواصل تقديم خدماتها في الدولة العضو الأصلية عن طريق فرع.
قطاع مصرفي أوربي أكثر شفافية: سيضمن دليل قواعد واحد أن يكون الوضع المالي للمؤسسات أكثر شفافية وقابلية للمقارنة عبر الاتحاد الأوروبي - للمشرفين وأصحاب الودائع والمستثمرين. وقد أظهرت الأزمة المالية أن عدم وضوح المتطلبات التنظيمية في مختلف الدول الأعضاء كان سببا رئيسيا لعدم الاستقرار المالي. ويشكل الافتقار إلى الشفافية عقبة أمام الإشراف الفعال ولكن أيضا على ثقة السوق والمستثمرين.
قطاع البنوك األوروبية األكثر كفاءة: سيضمن دليل قواعد واحد أن المؤسسات ال تلتزم ب 28 مجموعة مختلفة من القواعد.
ما هو دور السلطة المصرفية الأوروبية؟
وتلعب الهيئة املصرفية األوروبية دورا رئيسيا في بناء دليل القواعد املفردة في التنظيم املصريف حيث أنها مكلفة بإصدار عدد من مسودة اتفاقية بتس من أجل تنفيذ جوانب معينة من اتفاقية حقوق الطفل واتفاقية حقوق الطفل، على النحو املبني في النصوص التشريعية) .
وعلاوة على ذلك، فإن إبا هي المسؤولة عن تنسيق عملية واحدة Q & أمب؛ A عملية قواعد من خلالها يتم تقديم إجابات لأصحاب المصلحة على التنفيذ العملي ل كرد الرابع و كر، بتس والمبادئ التوجيهية التي تشكل جزءا من دليل قواعد واحدة. وتتماشى العملية في حد ذاتها مع المادة 29 من لائحة الاتحاد الأوروبي رقم 1093/2018 التي تطلب من نقابة المحامين الأوروبية "تطوير أدوات عملية وأدوات تقارب جديدة لتعزيز النهج والممارسات الإشرافية المشتركة". وهو يوفر نقطة واحدة للدخول والإجراءات لمعالجة المسائل، وبالتالي يوفر أداة فعالة للتعامل مع القضايا التي تتقاطع مع طبقات مختلفة من دليل قواعد واحدة، أو تتعلق مجالات مختلفة في وقت واحد. ومن المتوقع أن تلعب مراجعات الأقران دورا محوريا في ضمان الالتزام بالردود الواردة في Q & أمب؛ عملية، على الرغم من أنها ليست لها قوة في القانون.
وأخيرا، وكجزء من مساهمتها في ثقافة إشرافية مشتركة في جميع أنحاء الاتحاد الأوروبي، فإن إبا استعراض تطبيق جميع بتس التي اعتمدتها المفوضية الأوروبية واقتراح تعديلات عند الاقتضاء.
وهل ستتمكن الدول الأعضاء من المطالبة بمتطلبات رأسمالية أساسية أعلى؟
الاتحاد الأوروبي بشكل عام ومنطقة اليورو على وجه الخصوص لديها درجة عالية جدا من التكامل المالي والنقدي. ولذلك، ينبغي اتخاذ قرارات بشأن مستوى الاحتياجات من رأس المال بالنسبة للسوق الموحدة ككل، نظرا لأن جميع الدول الأعضاء تشعر بأثر هذه المتطلبات. ولا يمكن تحقيق الاستقرار المالي إلا من خلال الاتحاد الأوروبي. وليس من جانب كل دولة عضو بمفردها.
فعلى سبيل المثال، إذا كانت متطلبات رأس المال في الاتحاد الأوروبي منخفضة جدا، فلا يمكن لأي دولة عضو أن تفلت من المخاطر التي تهدد الاستقرار المالي بمجرد زيادة الاحتياجات لمؤسساتها الخاصة. وما لم تحذو الدول الأعضاء الأخرى حذوها، يمكن لفروع المؤسسات الأجنبية أن تواصل استيراد المخاطر.
كما أن ارتفاع مستويات متطلبات رأس المال في دولة عضو واحدة سيؤدي أيضا إلى تشويه المنافسة وتشجيع المراجحة التنظيمية. فعلى سبيل المثال، يمكن تشجيع المؤسسات على تركيز الأنشطة الخطرة في الدول الأعضاء التي لا تنفذ إلا الحد الأدنى من المتطلبات.
لذلك، يجب وضع متطلبات رأس المال على مستوى مناسب للاتحاد الأوروبي ككل. ولهذا السبب، وفقا للاتفاق السياسي، لا يمكن زيادة متطلبات رأس المال من قبل السلطات الوطنية (على سبيل المثال 6٪ سيت 1 بدلا من 4،5٪)، إلا إذا كان هناك إضافة محددة له ما يبرره بعد مراجعة إشرافية فردية أو على أساس النظامية (المخاطر النظامية، والمؤسسات النظامية العالمية وغيرها من المخزونات المؤسساتية النظامية والركيزة 2، انظر القسم 10 أدناه).
وهل ستظل الدول الأعضاء تحتفظ ببعض المرونة في إطار كتاب القواعد الموحدة؟
وستحتفظ الدول الأعضاء ببعض الإمكانيات التي تقتضي من مؤسساتها أن تحتفظ بمزيد من رؤوس الأموال (انظر أدناه جدول يتضمن جميع خيارات المرونة الممكنة - يرد وصف مفصل لمختلف المخزونات الرأسمالية في القسم 10 أدناه). فعلى سبيل المثال، ستحتفظ الدول الأعضاء بإمكانية وضع متطلبات رأسمالية أعلى للإقراض العقاري، وبذلك تكون قادرة على معالجة الفقاعات العقارية. وإذا ما فعلوا ذلك، فإن هذا ينطبق أيضا على مؤسسات من الدول الأعضاء الأخرى التي تقوم بأعمال تجارية في تلك الدولة العضو. وعلاوة على ذلك، تتحمل كل دولة عضو مسؤولية تعديل مستوى احتياطيها المضاد للاتجاهات الدورية إلى حالتها الاقتصادية وحماية القطاع الاقتصادي / المصرفي من أي متغيرات هيكلية أخرى ومن تعرض القطاع المصرفي لأي عوامل خطر أخرى تتعلق بالمخاطر التي تهدد الاستقرار المالي .
وسيسمح للدول الأعضاء أيضا بفرض إضافات إضافية على المصارف لتغطية المخاطر المنهجية أو الكلية.
وعلاوة على ذلك، فإن الدول الأعضاء ستحتفظ بطبيعة الحال بالصلاحيات الحالية في إطار "الركيزة 2"، أي القدرة على فرض متطلبات إضافية على مصرف معين بعد عملية الاستعراض الإشرافي.
وستكون للجنة أيضا صلاحية زيادة المتطلبات الاحترازية في جميع المجالات الخاضعة لشروط محددة (انظر الجدول أدناه)
عمود 1 المرونة.
مرونة الدول الأعضاء فيما يتعلق بزيادة الاحتياجات من رأس المال فقط.
Member States flexibility with regard to increasing requirements on capital / liquidity / large exposures / risk weights.
Any prudential requirement.
Systemic Important Institution (SII) Buffer.
Systemic risk buffer.
cyclical capital buffer.
Capital conservation buffer.
national macro flexibility.
Increasing real estate Risk weights and setting stricter criteria, i. e; Loan-To-Value (LTV)
Commission delegated Act measures.
CRD 133 and 134.
1) Mandatory surcharge for global SIIs applicable from 2018. The surcharge will amount to between 1 and 3.5 % of RWAs depending on the degree of systemic importance of an institution.
2) Optional surcharge for other SIIs applicable from 2018. The surcharge will amount to up to 2% of RWAs.
Optional systemic risk buffer on all or a subset of institutions to cover structural or systemic risks.
1) From 1 Jan 2017 onwards, Member State competent or designated authority can set the buffer between 0-3% subject to notification to Commission, EBA and ESRB.
2) Buffer rate can be set between 3 – 5% from 2018 onwards, notification as above but COM opinion then comply or explain.
3) Above 5% the Setting Member State must be authorized by the Commission through a Commission implementing Act before setting the buffer.
Macro-prudential buffer. Buffer rate based on credit-to–GDP indicator. Institutions established in a Member State different from the one setting the buffer rate have to apply the same buffer rate on exposures towards clients located in the latter Member State. A Member State must require its institutions to recognise the buffer rate set by another Member State up to 2.5%, but can choose to require them to recognise more.
Mandatory capital buffer equal to 2.5% of RWAs.
Setting Member States have to notify and justify more stringent measure to the Commission, EBA and ESRB. The Commission shall adopt an opinion in cases of potential distortion of the Internal Market.
Council can overrule the adverse Commission’s Opinion. The scope of the measures is broad at includes, for instance,
large exposure limits and risk weights.
Based on reported losses on real estate lending competent authorities can set higher risk weights up to 150% and stricter criteria with respect to LTVs.
COM can adopt delegated acts to set temporarily (one year) stricter prudential for specific exposures including the level of own funds, large exposures, disclosure requirements to address risks that affect all Member States.
Pillar 2 refers to the possibility for national supervisors to impose a wide range of measures - including additional capital and liquidity requirements – on an individual and on consolidated bases in order to address higher-than-normal risk. They do that on the basis of a supervisory review and evaluation process, during which they assess how institutions are complying with EU banking law, the risks they face and the risks they pose to the financial system. Following this review, supervisors decide whether e. g. the institution's risk management arrangements and level of own funds ensure a sound management and coverage of the risks they face and pose. If the supervisor finds that the institution faces higher risk, it can then require the institution to hold more capital or meet stricter liquidity requirements. In taking this decision, supervisors should notably take into account the potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial system in all other Member States concerned. Article 103 of CRDIV clarifies that supervisors can extend their conclusions to types of institutions that, belonging to the same region or sector, face and/or pose similar risks.
How will the new rules affect those Member States that have already decided to go further than Basel III or are planning to do so?
Some Member States (e. g. Spain) have already decided to go above the minimum levels of capital foreseen by Basel III. Some (e. g. Sweden, Cyprus) have indicated their intention to start doing so. Others (e. g. UK) have national processes under way that consider requiring a level of own funds above Basel III from parts of their banking sector. In some instances, Member States have also decided to introduce more quickly the changes foreseen under Basel III that increase the quality of capital as well.
According to the new legislative framework, Member States are free to anticipate the full implementation of Basel III and hence move to the capital requirements foreseen for 1 January 2019 already today, should they so wish. While Member States will not be able to exceed the level of own funds requirement set by the new rules, they can use the instruments of flexibility foreseen by that agreement, namely the counter-cyclical buffer, the systemic risk buffer, the global and other systemic institution buffers, and Pillar 2.
What is bank capital?
Capital can be defined in different ways. The accounting definition of capital is not the same as the definition used for regulatory capital purposes.
For the purposes of prudential requirements for banks, capital is not obtained simply by deducting the value of an institution's liabilities (what it owes) from its assets (what it owns). Regulatory capital is more conservative than accounting capital. Only capital that is at all times freely available to absorb losses qualifies as regulatory capital. Additional conservatism is added by adjusting this measure of capital further by e. g. deducting assets that may not have a stable value in stressed market circumstances (e. g. goodwill) and not recognising gains that have not yet been realised.
What is a capital adequacy requirement?
It is the amount of capital an institution is required to hold compared to the amount of assets, to cover unexpected losses. In the CRR, this is called 'own funds requirement' and is expressed as a percentage of risk weighted assets.
Why is capital important?
The purpose of capital is to absorb the losses that a bank does not expect to make in the normal course of business (unexpected losses). The more capital a bank has, the more losses it can suffer before it defaults. If a firm owes more than it owns (its assets are worth less than its liabilities), it cannot pay its debt and is thereby insolvent. If a bank has less regulatory capital than what it is required, supervisors can take measures to prevent insolvency.
What are risk-weighted assets?
In order to calculate the capital an institution needs to hold, CRR defines how to weigh an institution's assets according to their risk. Safe assets (e. g. cash) are disregarded; other assets (e. g. loans to other institutions) are considered more risky and get a higher weight. The more risky assets an institution holds, the more capital it has to have. In addition to risk weighing on balance sheet assets, institutions must have capital also against risks related to off balance sheet exposures such as loan - and credit card commitments. These are also risk weighed.
What is the difference between Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital?
Capital comes in different forms that serve different purposes. There are two types of capital:
Going concern capital: this allows an institution to continue its activities and helps to prevent insolvency. Tier 1 capital is considered to be the going concern capital. The purest form is Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital.
Gone concern capital: this helps ensuring that depositors and senior creditors can be repaid if the institution fails. This category of capital includes hybrid capital and subordinated debt. Gone concern capital is named Tier 2 capital.
What was the problem with capital during the crisis?
Banks and investment firms did not all have sufficient amounts of capital and the capital they had was sometimes of poor quality as it was not readily available to absorb losses as they materialised. To prevent institutions from defaulting, public funds had to be used to prop up institutions.
How do the new rules increase the quality and quantity of capital?
Under the existing framework, banks and investment firms need to have a total amount of capital equal to at least 8% of risk weighted assets. Under the new rules, while the total capital an institution will need to hold remains at 8%, the share that has to be of the highest quality – common equity tier 1 (CET1) – increases from 2% to 4.5%.
The criteria for each capital instrument will also become more stringent. Furthermore, the proposal harmonises the adjustments made to capital in order to determine the amount of regulatory capital that it is prudent to recognise for regulatory purposes. This new harmonised definition significantly increases the effective level of regulatory capital institutions are required to have. One unit of Basel II capital is therefore not the same as one unit of Basel III capital.
Is the new legislation only going to increase the quality of capital?
No. While the basic own funds requirement stays at 8% of risk-weighted assets, the new rules also establish five new capital buffers: the capital conservation buffer, the counter-cyclical buffer, the systemic risk buffer, the global systemic institutions buffer and the other systemic institutions buffer (see section on capital buffers). Naturally, on top of all these own funds requirements, supervisors may add extra capital to cover for other risks following a supervisory review (see question on Pillar 2 above) and institutions may also decide to hold an additional amount of capital on their own.
How can institutions increase their capital ratio to meet the new requirements?
Institutions can increase their capital ratio in two ways:
Increase capital : An institution can increase its capital by either issuing new shares and/or not pay dividends to its shareholders, i. e. to retain profits. These new shares and retained profits become included in its capital base. Provided they do not increase their risk-weighted assets (RWAs), this increases their capital ratio.
Reduce risk-weighted assets : An institution can also cut back on lending, sell loan portfolios and/or make less risky loans and investments, thereby reducing its RWAs, which has the effect of - for a given amount of capital - increasing its capital ratio (capital/RWA).
When will these provisions start to apply?
Basel III foresees a substantial transition period before the new capital requirements apply in full. This is to ensure that increasing the resilience of institutions does not unduly affect lending to the real economy (i. e. to ensure that institutions do not cut back on lending and investments). The provisions related to the level of own funds will accordingly be phased in as of the 1 January 2017.
Capital instruments that will not meet the new, stricter eligibility criteria will be phased out over 8 years in order to help to ensure a smooth transition to the new rules.
Do the new rules allow Member States to implement Basel III faster than foreseen by the Basle timetable?
Basel III foresees a gradual transition to the stricter standards, with full implementation as of 1 January 2019. The CRR foresees the same transition period (except in some well-defined, special cases) but allows Member States to implement the stricter definition and/or level of capital more quickly than is required by Basel III.
Do the new rules depart from the Basel III definition of capital?
No. The CRR takes exactly the same approach as Basel III by imposing 14 strict criteria that any instrument would have to meet to qualify, with appropriate adaptation to the criteria for instruments issued by non-joint stock companies such as mutuals, cooperative banks and savings institutions. Therefore the full substance of Basel III has been translated into the European laws. Because of the lack of a common EU concept of “common shares”, the legal form of the highest quality form of capital is not restricted to the notion of "ordinary shares". This does not affect the substance as CET1 must meet 14 strict criteria. According to the EU rules, an instrument that, for whatever legal reason, is not called “ordinary share” in a given country law and meets those 14 criteria, is equally loss absorbent than an “ordinary share” and therefore is in substance equivalent to the latter.
What are the conditions capital instruments have to meet to qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 instruments?
Article 28 of the CRR states that capital instrument can only qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 instruments if a number of conditions are met. These can be summarised for joint-stock companies as follows (some special provisions apply for mutual, cooperatives, savings banks and similar institutions):
they are issued directly by the institution;
they are paid up and their purchase is not funded by the institution;
they meet a number of conditions as regards their classification (e. g. they qualify as capital for accounting and insolvency purposes);
they are clearly and separately disclosed on institutions' financial statements balance sheet;
they are perpetual;
the principal amount of the instruments may not be reduced or repaid unless the institution is e. g. liquidated. Moreover, the provisions governing the instruments should not indicate that the principal amount of the instruments would or might be reduced or repaid other than in the liquidation of the institution;
the instruments meet a number of conditions as regards distributions (e. g. no preferential distributions in time, distributions may be paid only out of distributable items, the conditions governing the instruments do not include a cap or other restriction on the maximum level of distributions, the level of distributions is not determined on the basis of the amount for which the instruments were purchased, etc…);
compared to all the capital instruments issued by the institution, the instruments absorb the first and proportionately greatest share of losses as they occur, and each instrument absorbs losses to the same degree as all other Common Equity Tier 1 instruments;
the instruments rank below all other claims in the event of insolvency or liquidation of the institution;
the instruments entitle their owners to a claim on the residual assets of the institution, which, in the event of its liquidation and after the payment of all senior claims, is proportionate to the amount of such instruments issued and is not fixed or subject to a cap;
the instruments are not secured, or guaranteed by any entity in the group (e. g. the institution, its subsidiaries, the parent institution or its subsidiaries, etc);
the instruments are not subject to any arrangement that enhances the seniority of claims under the instruments in insolvency or liquidation.
These conditions ensure that only the highest quality capital instruments qualify as CET1.
Do the new rules recognise only ordinary shares as Common Equity Tier 1 or could other instruments be recognised as well?
To warrant recognition in the highest quality category of regulatory capital, a capital instrument must be of extremely high quality and must absorb losses fully as they arise.
The 14 criteria for Common Equity Tier 1 capital agreed in Basel III are extremely strict by design. Only instruments of the highest quality would be capable of meeting them.
Provided an instrument met those strict criteria - including in respect of its loss absorbency – it would qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 capital.
What are minority interests and what amount of minority interests can be recognised?
Minority interests are capital in a subsidiary that is owned by other shareholders from outside the group. They are particularly important in the EU, as EU banking groups often have subsidiaries that are not fully owned by the parent company but have several other owners.
Basel III recognises minority interests and certain capital instruments issued by subsidiaries (e. g. hybrids and subordinated debt) to be included in the capital of the group only where those subsidiaries are banks (or are subject to the same prudential requirements) and up to the level of the new minimum capital requirements and the capital conservation buffer.
The CRR recognises a higher amount of minority interests, i. e. up to and including capital buffers, the Pillar 2 requirement and other prudential requirements. This is a simple result of the fact that the EU legislation does put at the disposal of the Supervisors several additional capital buffers and allows a degree of flexibility for Member states to set higher requirements (see section 10).
What will the treatment of significant holdings in insurance companies be?
Basel III requires banks to deduct significant investments in unconsolidated financial entities, including insurance entities, from the highest quality form of capital (CET1). The objective is to prevent the double counting of capital, i. e. to ensure that the bank is not bolstering its own capital with capital that is also used to support the risks of an insurance subsidiary.
The CRR allows an updated version of the Financial Conglomerates Directive (FICOD) approach, which allows consolidation of banking and insurance entities in a group, to continue to be used as an alternative to the Basel III deduction approach. The alternative approach is allowed because consolidation is considered to prevent double counting of capital as well.
What are Deferred Tax Assets (DTAs) and what will be their treatment?
Deferred Tax Assets (DTAs) are assets that may be used to reduce the amount of future tax obligations. Basel III treats DTAs differently depending on how much they can be relied upon when needed to help a bank to absorb losses. Where their value is less certain to be realised, they must be deducted from capital. However, Basel has subsequently clarified that DTAs that are transformed on a mandatory and automatic basis into a claim on the State when an institution makes a loss would be one of the forms of DTAs for which deduction would not be warranted.
The CRR implements the above Basel rules.
What is the Basel I floor and will its application be prolonged?
Basel II requires more capital to be held by banks for riskier business than would be required under Basel I. For less risky business, Basel II requires less capital to be held than Basel I. This is what Basel II was designed to do: to be more risk sensitive.
To ensure banks do not hold too little regulatory capital, Basel II set a floor on the amount of capital required, which is 80% of the capital that would be required under Basel I.
While the floor required by the original CRD expired by the end of 2009, the CRD III reinstated it until end-2018.
In the light of the continuing effects of the financial crisis in the banking sector and the extension of the Basel I floor adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in July 2009, the CRR reinstates the floor in 2017, to be applied until 2017. However, national authorities would be able to waive the requirement under strict conditions.
It also introduces a requirement for a continuous revision of the need for such a floor since it should not be maintained in place longer than is strictly necessary.
What will be the cut-off date for recognising instruments that do not meet the eligibility criteria?
To ensure a smooth transition to the new Basel III rules, instruments that are currently used that do not meet the new rules have to be phased out over a 10-year period, provided they were issued prior to the date of agreement of the new rules by Basel (12 September 2018). Under Basel III, instruments issued after the cut-off date would need to comply with the new rules or would not be recognised from 1 January 2018.
The CRR sets the cut-off date at 31 December 2018 (except for instruments used for the recapitalisation of banks by Member States, where special rules apply). The phase-out period starts in 2017 and lasts for 8 years.
What will be the treatment of instruments no longer eligible as CET1?
The CRR phases them out over a 8-year period. For instruments injected by a government prior to its date of entry into force the CRR allows to fully recognise them in CET1 capital for a 4-year period.
The new rules require institutions to hold more capital against investments in hedge funds, real estate, venture capital and private equity than they have done to up now. Why is that?
The current CRD (points 66-67 of Annex VI, Part 1) states that competent authorities may apply a 150% risk weight to "exposures associated with particularly high risks such as investments in venture capital firms and private equity investments". However, what 'particularly high risks' are has not been defined. The lack of obligation combined with the lack of a clear definition has led to different assessments and risk weights granted to the same type of exposures. On the basis of an advice from CEBS (Committee of European Banking Supervisors, the predecessor of EBA), the CRR now requires banks to assign a 150% risk weight to these types of exposures (investments in venture capital firms, alternative investment funds and speculative real estate financing as well as "exposures that are associated with particularly high risks"). The CRR now also clearly defines the criteria that supervisors should use when an exposure is associated with such risks and requires EBA to develop guidelines in that respect.
What is the role of contingent capital in the new framework?
The CRR requires all instruments recognised in the Additional Tier 1 capital of a credit institution or investment firm to be written down, or converted into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, when the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of the institution falls below 5.125%. It also allows institutions to issue Additional Tier 1 instruments with a trigger higher than 5.125%. The new rules do not recognise other forms of contingent capital for the purposes of meeting regulatory capital requirements.
What is hybrid capital? What role does it play?
Hybrid capital is a term used to describe forms of capital instrument that have features of both debt and equity instruments. Such instruments in issue during the crisis proved not to be sufficiently loss absorbent. The new rules build upon the improvements made under CRD II to the quality of hybrid Tier 1 capital instruments, introducing stricter criteria for their inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital. As explained above, this includes a requirement for all such instruments to absorb losses by being written down, or converted into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, when the key measure of a credit institution or investment firm's solvency - the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio - falls below 5.125%.
What Rules does the Regulation establish on liquidity buffers?
The crisis has shown that institutions' did not hold sufficient liquid means (e. g. cash or other assets that can be quickly converted into cash with no or little loss of value). When the crisis hit, many firms were short of liquidity. This contributed to the demise of several financial institutions. While a number of Member States currently impose some form of quantitative regulatory standard for liquidity, no harmonised regulatory treatment exists at EU level.
Basel III introduces two new ratios and foresees in each case an observation period in order to identify and address possible unintended consequences. The BCBS will make the necessary changes, if any, before 2018 or 2018, respectively.
Therefore subject to the observation period (see below) the Regulation establishes two new liquidity buffers:
First, to improve the short-term (over a thirty day period) resilience of the liquidity risk profile of financial institutions, there is a Liquidity Coverage Requirement (LCR).
Second, to ensure that an institution has an acceptable amount of stable funding to support the institutions assets and activities over the medium term (over a one year period), there is a N et Stable Funding Requirement (NSFR);
How will the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) be introduced?
The observation period will start immediately after the entering into force of the Regulation and institutions will be required to report to national authorities the elements that are needed to verify that they have adequate liquidity coverage. They will do this in a uniform way, with standard reporting formats to be developed by the EBA. On the basis of these data, the EBA will prepare reports for submission to the Commission. The Commission will have a delegated power to specify the detailed liquidity coverage requirement for application in 2018.
What is the impact of the Basel Committee decision this January on the LCR?
Many observers including the Commission were concerned that the original calibration of the LCR was too severe. In a time of economic difficulty, there were concerns that implementation of the LCR as originally foreseen by the Basel Committee in December 2018 could have an adverse impact on the real economy by promoting a shift from lending (loan assets) to more liquid assets (e. g. cash, central bank deposits) as institutions prepared to meet the new LCR requirements. For this reason the Commission attaches considerable importance to the observation period after which the detailed LCR will be specified.
These concerns were also recognised by the Basel Committee. On 7 January 2018, the Basel Committe issued the text of a revised Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) which had been endorsed by the governing body of the Basel Committee, namely, the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS). This text included a revised timetable (cf below) for the phasing-in of the LCR standard.
The same day, Commissioner Michel Barnier also issued a press release welcoming the revised agreement unanimously reached by the Basel Committee. The package of amendments to the LCR as originally formulated in 2018 including its phasing-in, addressed concerns previously identified by the Commission. However, the final formulation of the LCR is still not fully complete and important work is still continuing under the Basel Committee. Therefore the approach for the final adoption of the LCR under EU law in 2018 is maintained, namely full use of the observation period and adoption of the detailed LCR by the Commission taking account of the EBA Reports and international developments such as the final Basel LCR standard.
What will be the time schedule for implementation of the LCR?
Because of concerns that too rapid implementation of the original LCR could have detrimental impact on the real economy, the text published by the Basel committee on 7th January 2018, proposed a minimum phasing-in of the LCR over 5 years starting with 60% of the LCR in 2018, rising progressively to reach 100% in 2019. However, given the important role liquidity mismatches played in the financial crisis, the Union legislators considered it appropriate to have a somewhat faster implementation schedule than Basel. The Regulation therefore sets the following schedule for LCR implementation:
In other words, under the Regulation, 100% LCR implementation will be reached in 2018, i. e. one year earlier than Basel.
But why does the Regulation phase in the LCR one year faster than Basel?
The financial crisis that started in 2007 showed that liquidity is absolutely key for the resilience of institutions in stress situations. The treatment of liquidity is fundamental, both for the stability of banks as well as for their role in supporting wider economic recovery. Therefore, to highlight this importance, the Union co-legislators decided to advance full implementation of the LCR by one year so that a 100% LCR will already apply in 2018.
However, if appropriate and in the light of a report to be prepared by the EBA taking into account the economic situation as well as European specificities and international regulatory developments, the Commission is empowered to defer the 100% phasing-in of the LCR until 2019 and apply in 2018 a 90% LCR, in line with the Basel schedule.
Is an institution always obliged to have a LCR ratio above 100%?
No. In a stressed situation an institution may be obliged to make use of its liquid assets with the result that its LCR ratio (temporarily) falls below 100%. This point has been specifically recognised in the text published by the Basel committee on 7th January 2018. However, it should be noted that even in this situation, under the Regulation an institution is required to immediately notify the competent authorities and submit a plan for the timely restoration of the LCR ratio to above 100%.
Does that mean there are no new liquidity rules until 2018?
No. Again to underline the importance of avoiding liquidity mismatches, from the date of adoption, the Regulation already establishes a general requirement that institutions need to hold liquid assets to cover their net cash outflows in stressed conditions over a thirty day period. However, this is a general requirement and not a detailed ratio requirement as when the LCR enters into force in 2018.
Will it be possible to accelerate the implementation of the LCR at national level?
نعم فعلا. Before the LCR becomes a binding minimum standard in 2018, Member States may maintain or introduce binding minimum standards for liquidity coverage requirements and require LCR levels up to 100% before the LCR is fully introduced at a rate of 100% in 2018.
How does the Regulation implement the 7 January 2018 revised Basel agreement regarding an extended definition of liquid assets and revised outflow rates?
The Commission attaches a special importance to the observation period in order to properly assess the impact of the new liquidity requirements on institutions and financial markets and ensure requirements are defined and calibrated in the most appropriate manner.
This is why the Regulation does not fix at this stage a closed list of liquid assets. Instead, it specifies a minimum list of items that shall be considered as liquid, while the EBA shall report to the Commission by 31 December 2018 on appropriate uniform definition of liquid assets of high and extremely high liquidity and credit quality. In its report, the EBA shall consider a variety of assets, including Retail Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) of high liquidity and credit quality, local government bonds, commercial paper, equities listed on a recognised exchange, corporate bonds, and so on.
Pending the uniform definition of liquid assets, institutions shall identify and report themselves in a given currency, assets that are respectively of high and extremely high liquidity and credit quality. At the same time, competent authorities may provide general guidance that institutions shall follow in identifying those assets.
In the same manner, the EBA shall report to the Commission on the calibration of inflow and outflow rates. It should be noted that the EBA shall in particular report on the need for any mechanism to restrict the value of liquidity inflows, e. g. by establishing an appropriate inflow cap; as well as report on any mechanism to restrict the coverage of liquidity requirements by certain categories of liquidity assets, e. g. by establishing a minimum percentage for liquid assets of extremely high liquidity and credit quality. Note that in its report, the EBA shall take due account of international regulatory developments. The Commission is empowered to specify the detailed liquidity coverage requirements by delegated act.
When will the net stable funding requirement come into force?
The same basic approach will be followed for the NSFR, namely an observation period, albeit longer, before adoption of the standard into Union law. However, work on the NSFR has not progressed as far as that on the LCR and there is still a very considerable amount of development work to be carried out by the Basel Committee.
Therefore in the light of the results of the observation period and reports to be prepared by the EBA, the Commission will prepare, if appropriate, a legislative proposal by 31 December 2018 to ensure that institutions use stable sources of funding, taking full account of the diversity of the European banking sector.
Does that mean there are no NSFR rules until 2018?
No. several years before any binding minimum standards for net stable funding requirements may be specified under Union law, the Regulation already establishes the general rule from 1 January 2018 that institutions shall ensure that long term obligations are adequately met with a diversity of stable funding requirements under both normal and stressed conditions.
What is the role of covered bonds in the composition of the liquidity buffer?
For the LCR, a particular focus of the observation period will be set on the definition of liquid assets. The EBA will test different criteria for measuring how liquid securities are under stressed market conditions. This will prepare the ground for a decision before 2018 that will ultimately determine the eligibility criteria for the liquidity buffer.
For the NSFR, the Commission will analyse how such a structural requirement plays out across the diverse EU banking sector, notably as regards its ability to provide long-term funding to support the real economy.
Why reducing leverage in the banking sector?
Leverage is an inherent part of banking activity; as soon as an entity's assets exceed its capital base it is levered. The Commission does not propose to eliminate leverage, but to reduce excessive leverage. The financial crisis highlighted that credit institutions and investment firms were highly levered, i. e. they took on more and more on - and off-balance sheet items on the basis of an increasingly thin capital base.
What is the Leverage Ratio?
In line with Basel III, the Commission therefore proposes to start the process of introducing a leverage ratio. The leverage ratio is defined as Tier 1 capital divided by a measure of non-risk weighted on - and off-balance sheet items.
What purpose does the Leverage Ratio serve?
The purpose of the leverage ratio is to have a simple instrument that offers a safeguard against the risks associated with the risk models underpinning risk weighted assets (e. g. that the model is flawed or that data is measured incorrectly). The ultimate aim is also to constrain leverage and to bring institutions' assets more in line with their capital in order to help mitigate destabilising deleveraging processes in downturn situations.
Will institutions be required to have a Leverage Ratio above a certain value?
Since the Leverage Ratio is a new regulatory tool in the EU, there is a lack of information about the effectiveness and the consequences of implementing it as a binding (Pillar 1) measure. It is therefore important to gather more information before making the leverage ratio a binding requirement. In line with Basel III, the Commission therefore proposes a step by step approach:
Initial implementation of the Leverage Ratio as a Pillar 2 measure;
Data gathering on the base of thoroughly defined criteria as of 1 January 2017;
Public disclosure as of 2018;
Report by the end of 2018 including, where appropriate, a legislative proposal to introduce the leverage ratio as a binding measure as of 2018.
Why institutions should disclose their leverage ratio as of 1 January 2018? Does that not effectively make it a binding requirement in view of market pressure?
Requiring the disclosure of the Leverage Ratio is in line with the EU's push to introduce more transparency in the financial sector in general and in the banking sector in particular. It is also fully in line with Basel III rules. Even in the absence of such a requirement, the market would almost certainly demand institutions to disclose the information on their Leverage Ratio.
How do the new rules address the concerns that the introduction of the Leverage Ratio would have significant negative impacts on trade finance and lending to small and medium enterprises, to name just two areas?
There isn’t currently sufficient information in order to estimate the precise impact of the Leverage Ratio. That is why the Leverage Ratio will not be introduced outright as a binding measure, but rather as a Pillar 2 measure (i. e. the judgement on whether or not the leverage ratio of a particular institution is too high and whether that institution should hold more capital as a consequence will be left to the supervisor of that institution). Furthermore, that is why the proposal foresees an extended observation period during which the necessary data will be gathered, and a review to estimate the impact of the Leverage Ratio based on those data that would then inform the decision on the introduction of the Leverage Ratio as a binding measure.
The Regulation applies lower conversion factors to trade related off-balance sheet items than those initially provided in the Commission's initial proposal. This intends to mitigate the impact of the leverage ratio on trade finance operations and lending to SMEs.
How do the new rules take into account various business models throughout the Union and address the issue of low-risk type of business profiles?
The review of the leverage ratio will include the identification of institutions’ business models and whether the level of the leverage ratio should be the same for all types of business models. If deemed appropriate, several levels of the leverage ratio may be introduced in order to reflect the overall risk profile, the business model and size of institutions.
8. COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK.
What will be the treatment of counterparty credit risk arising from derivatives?
Building on the Regulation on OTC derivatives and markets infrastructures ( EMIR ) ( MEMO/12/232 ), the new rules increase the own funds requirements associated with credit institutions' and investment firms' derivatives that are traded over-the-counter ("OTC derivatives") and securities financing transactions (e. g. repurchase agreements).
The new rules also amend the current treatment of institutions' exposure to central counterparties (CCPs)( vii ) stemming from those transactions, as well as exchange-traded derivatives transactions, in the following way:
Unlike under existing rules, exposures to a CCP will be subject to an own funds requirement. The size of the requirement will depend on the type of exposure: trade exposures to a CCP (e. g. exposures due to collateral posted to the CCP) will be subject to a substantially smaller own funds requirement than exposures due to contributions to the CCP's default fund. This is because default fund contributions can be used for mutualising losses due to the default of another clearing member.
Compared to exposures from bilaterally cleared transactions, exposures to CCPs will be subject to lower own funds requirements as long as the CCP will meet certain requirements (in the specific, they will need to meet the requirements laid down in EMIR or be subject to equivalent rules, in case of a third-country CCP). If the CCP will not meet those criteria, then trade exposures will be subject to the bilateral treatment and default fund contributions will be subject to a high own funds requirement.
How will the new rules affect non-financial corporates and their use of non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives?
The CRR exempts non-centrally cleared OTC derivative transactions between banks and non-financial corporates from the new Basel 3 capital requirement for the so-called Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) risk, when such transactions do not exceed relevant thresholds that are specified in EMIR.
Are CRR provisions on capital requirements for CVA risk in line with Basel 3 rules?
The CRR contains a capital requirement for credit valuation adjustment (CVA) risk, calculated in the manner suggested in the Basel III document. However, in response to concerns about the initial calibration of this requirement for certain counterparties, the EU co-legislators decided to provide for certain exemptions from this requirement. There is a review clause in the agreement connected to the calibration and scope of the requirement. During the democratic process of rule approval co-legislators have become wary of the impact of the requirement on non-financial counterparties in the EU and will approach the required review in an open-minded way, and taking due account of the effective CVA implementation in other jurisdictions. At the same time, the review will also look at those concerns from our international partners, which relate in particular to the extension of exemptions, originally intended to benefit European non-financial firms - including SMEs -, to firms in third countries, and to the preservation of the level playing field.
How do the new rules strengthen supervision?
Regulation, no matter how good, cannot overcome poor supervision. The financial crisis brought this point on the agenda. As a result, the EU has already taken steps to strengthen supervision, notably with the creation of the three European Supervisory Authorities and the European System of Financial Supervision ( MEMO/10/434 ).
The new rules strengthen banking supervision further by requiring the annual preparation of a supervisory programme for each supervised institution on the basis of a risk assessment; greater and more systematic use of on-site supervisory examinations; more robust standards and more intrusive and forward-looking supervisory assessments.
10. CAPITAL BUFFERS.
What the new rules provide for as regards the capital buffers?
On the basis of the Basel provisions the following capital buffers are introduced.
Capital conservation buffer.
The capital conservation buffer is a new prudential tool introduced by Basel III and implemented by the CRD IV. It is a capital buffer of 2.5% of total exposures of a bank that needs to be met with an additional amount of the highest quality of capital (i. e. CET1 capital). It sits on top of the 4.5% CET1 capital requirement (see Section 5 on capital above). As its name indicates, the buffer’s objective is to conserve a bank’s capital. When a bank breaches the buffer, i. e. when its CET1 capital ratio falls below 7%, automatic safeguards kick in and limit the amount of dividend and bonus payments a bank can make. The further the bank “eats” into the buffer, the stricter the limits become. This prevents the bank’s capital to be further eroded by such payments.
The countercyclical buffer is another new prudential tool introduced by Basel III. As the name indicates, the purpose of this buffer is to counteract the effects of the economic cycle on banks’ lending activity, thus making the supply of credit less volatile and possibly even reduce the probability of credit bubbles or crunches. It works as follows: in good times, i. e. where an economy is booming and credit growth is strong, it requires a bank to have an additional amount of capital (as in the case of the capital conservation buffer, CET1 capital). This prevents that credit becomes too cheap (there is a cost to the capital that a bank must have) and that banks lend too much. If a bank does not have enough capital to fill this buffer, the same restrictions as in the case of the capital conservation buffer kick in.
When the economic cycle turns, and economic activity slows down or even contracts, this buffer can be “released” (i. e. the bank is no longer required to have the additional capital). This allows the bank to keep lending to the real economy or at least reduce its lending by less than would otherwise be the case.
Global systemic institution buffer.
The CRD IV includes a mandatory systemic risk buffer of CET1 capital for banks that are identified by the relevant authority as globally systemically important. The identification criteria and the allocation into categories of systemic importance are in conformity with the G-20 agreed G-SIFI criteria and include size, cross border activities and interconnectedness. The mandatory surcharge will be between 1 and 3.5% CET 1 of RWAs, will need to be met with CET1 capital and will apply from 1 January 2018 onwards. The G-SII "surcharge" reflects the cost of being systemically important and is aimed at reducing the moral hazard of implicit support and bail-out by taxpayer money. The Financial Stability Board’s provisional list of 28 G-SIFIs includes 14 EU institutions.
Other systemically important institutions buffer.
In addition to the mandatory Global SII buffer the CRD IV provides for a supervisory option for a buffer on “other” systemically important institutions. This includes domestically important institutions as well as EU important institutions. In order to prevent adverse impacts on the internal market there is framing in the form of the criteria used to identify O-SIIs, a notification/ justification procedure and an upper limit to the size of the buffer (2% of RWAs). The O-SII buffer is applicable from 2018 onwards but Member States wanting to set higher capital for certain banks earlier can use the systemic risk buffer. The optional O-SII buffer CET1 capital will be recognised for the purpose of meeting the consolidated mandatory G-SII buffer requirement.
In addition to all the capital buffers mentioned above, the new rules provide for a:
Systemic risk buffer.
Each Member State may introduce a Systemic Risk Buffer of Common Equity Tier 1 for the financial sector or one or more subsets of the sector, in order to prevent and mitigate long term non-cyclical systemic or macro-prudential risks with the potential of serious negative consequences to the financial system and the real economy in a specific Member State. Until 2018, in case of buffer rates of more than 3%, Member States will need prior approval from the Commission, which will take into account the assessments of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the EBA.
From 2018 onwards and for buffer rates between 3 and 5 % the Member States setting the buffer will have to notify the Commission, the EBA, and the ESRB. The Commission will provide an opinion on the measure decided and if this opinion is negative, the Member States will have to "comply or explain". Buffer rates above 5% will need to be authorized by the Commission through an implementing act, taking into account the opinions provided by the ESRB and by the EBA.
11. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.
How does CRD IV improve corporate governance?
The new Directive introduces clear corporate governance arrangements and mechanisms for institutions. These rules concern the composition of boards, their functioning and their role in risk oversight and strategy in order to improve the effectiveness of risk oversight by boards. The status and the independence of the risk management function is also enhanced. Supervisors will play an explicit role in monitoring risk governance arrangements of institutions.
The measures adopted should help avoid excessive risk-taking by individual institutions and ultimately the accumulation of excessive risk in the financial system. The principle of proportionality, taking into account the size and complexity of the activities of the institution as well as different corporate governance models, applies to all measures.
Corporate governance – Does CRD IV impose board diversity?
Diversity in board composition should contribute to effective risk oversight by boards, providing for a broader range of views and opinion and therefore avoiding the phenomenon of group think.
Institutions are therefore required to employ a broad set of qualities and competences when recruiting members to the management body and for that purpose to put in place a policy promoting diversity on the management body. Moreover, the nomination committees of significant institutions are also required to decide on a target for the underrepresented gender on the board and to prepare a policy on how to increase the number of the underrepresented gender.
Institutions must make public their policy on diversity with regard to selection of members of the management body, its objectives and any relevant targets, and the extent to which these objectives and targets have been achieved.
What does CRD IV do to improve transparency regarding the activities of banks and investment funds in different countries?
Increased transparency regarding the activities of institutions which operate on a multi-national basis, and in particular as regards profits, taxes and subsidies in different jurisdictions, is essential for regaining the trust of EU citizens in the financial sector. Under CRD IV, Member States will have to ensure that institutions disclose this type of information to the public, by Member State and by third country in which they have operations. The Commission will, however, first assess the potential impact of some of these disclosure obligations and, if appropriate, make a proposal to amend the scope and/or modalities of disclosure.
Why reforming only CRD IV (banks and investment firms) and disregarding other sectors (insurance, investment funds)?
The corporate governance failings which contributed to the financial crisis occurred mostly in banks. Also, existing rules in the banking sector are of a very general nature as compared to insurance or investment fund legislation where rules on internal organisation and risk management are much more detailed and precise. That is why we started with reforming corporate governance in credit institutions and investment firms. However, for the sake of consistency and in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage between sectors, it will be necessary to review the existing legislation in other sectors (Solvency II, UCITS Directive) to align it, when necessary, to the outcome of the final text of the CRD IV package. Nevertheless, the specificities of each sector should be taken into account, and the rules should not necessarily be identical for banks, insurance companies and investment funds.
What are the existing rules regarding remuneration?
In order to ensure that remuneration policies do not give incentives to take risks which undermine sound and effective risk management and which exacerbate excessive risk-taking behaviour, CRD III introduced in 2018 a number of technical criteria ( viii ) underpinning the total remuneration policies (including salaries and discretionary pension benefits) of credit institutions and investment firms in relation to categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on their risk profile (‘material risk takers’) ( ix ). These included in particular the following requirements regarding the structure of remuneration:
a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50 %, of any variable remuneration should consist of equity-linked or other non-cash instruments; و.
a substantial portion of the variable remuneration component, and in any event at least 40 % to 60 % (the latter in the case of a variable remuneration component of “a particularly high amount”) should be deferred over a period of not less than three to five years.
While providing that fixed and variable components of total remuneration should be appropriately balanced and that the fixed component should represent a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration (allowing the possibility to pay no variable remuneration), it was left to the institutions to set the appropriate ratios between the fixed and the variable component of the total remuneration. CRD III did not set any maximum ratio between the fixed and the variable component.
Institutions also had an obligation to disclose to the public information regarding the remuneration policy and practices for material risk takers ( x ).
What are the new, additional rules introduced by CRD IV?
CRD IV essentially carries over the existing provisions of CRD III ( xi ) relating to remuneration. It also introduces additional transparency and disclosure requirements relating to the number of individuals earning more than EUR 1 million per year.
Furthermore, in order to tackle excessive risk taking the remuneration framework has been further strengthened with regard to the requirements for the relationship between the variable (or bonus) component of remuneration and the fixed component (or salary). The key elements of the new rule, which will apply to remuneration awarded for services and performance from 2017 onwards, are the following:
The variable component of the total remuneration shall not exceed 100% of the fixed component of the total remuneration of material risk takers;
Member States may allow the shareholders, owners or members of the institution, acting by a qualified majority involving either a minimum representation requirement for shares or equivalent ownership rights of 50 % and a voting majority of two thirds or no minimum representation requirement and a 75 % voting majority, to approve a higher maximum level of the variable component provided that this level does not exceed 200% of the fixed component of the total remuneration. In this context, for the purposes of calculating the maximum ratio, the use of deferred and bail-in-able instruments is specifically encouraged through a provision which allows Member States to permit the application of a notional discount rate to up to 25% of total variable remuneration provided that it is paid in instruments that are deferred for at least five years; و.
The competent authorities are to be informed of recommendations to shareholders and of the result of any shareholder vote, which shall not conflict with institutions' obligations to maintain a sound capital base.
The EBA is called upon to provide further technical guidance as regards the notional discount rate and the Commission will review and report on the application and the impact of the new rules by 30 June 2018.
Do the new rules apply to the remuneration of all staff?
No. The rules apply only for categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on their risk profile, such as senior management, risk takers, staff engaged in control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers. The EBA is called upon to develop draft regulatory standards with respect to qualitative and appropriate quantitative criteria to identify these categories of staff.
Do the new rules apply to all institutions and investment firms in the EU?
نعم فعلا. Moreover, the rules also apply to i) subsidiaries established outside the EEA of institutions which have their head office in the EEA and ii) subsidiaries established inside the EEA of institutions which have their head office outside the EEA. CRD IV provides that "[t]he application of [the remuneration provisions] shall be ensured by competent authorities for institutions at group, parent company and subsidiary levels, including those established in offshore financial centres" (see Article 92 of CRD IV). This provision already existed in CRD III. The Commission will review the application and the impact of this rule in due course.
What exactly do the new rules provide for regarding sanctions?
The proposal will require Member States to provide that appropriate administrative sanctions and measures can be applied to violations of EU banking legislation. For this purpose, the Directive will require them to comply with common minimum standards on:
types and addressees of sanctions,
the level of fines,
the criteria to be taken into account by competent authorities when applying sanctions,
the publication of sanctions,
the mechanism to encourage reporting of potential violations.
These provisions are without prejudice to the provisions of national criminal law.
Why are provisions on sanctions introduced in CRD?
The "CRD IV" package fundamentally overhauls the substantive prudential rules applicable to institutions. But these rules will only achieve their objective if they are effectively and consistently enforced throughout the EU. This requires that competent authorities have at their disposal not only supervisory powers allowing them to effectively oversee credit institutions but also sufficiently strict and convergent sanctioning powers to respond adequately to the violations (which may nevertheless occur), and prevent future violations.
However, the banking sector is one of the areas where national sanctioning regimes are divergent and not always appropriate to ensure deterrence.
For example, in the banking sector the maximum amount of fines provided for in case of a violation is unlimited or variable in five Member States, more than 1 million euro in nine Member States, and less than 150 000 euro in seven Member States. Those maximum levels, in the latter group in particular, appear to be rather small, especially in view of the large size of the banking groups operating in several of these States. For more examples see MEMO/10/660.
Therefore, the new framework provides for the introduction of rules to reinforce and approximate national sanctioning regimes.
Banking supervision is based on supervisory measures to prevent violations and restore banks' viability – why would sanctions be necessary?
When a bank is in distress, the first priority is in fact to save and not to sanction it.
In fact, the new rules are not introducing harmonised sanctions for violations of minimum capital requirements.
But sanctions are key to ensure other rules are respected – for example if banks don't report to supervisors as required, and thereby make supervision ineffective, or if banks act without authorisation.
What is planned to ensure that breaches are actually prosecuted and that appropriate sanctions are actually handed down?
The new rules make sure that all supervisors have the possibility, that is to say are empowered, to impose effective sanctions. National supervisors remain mainly responsible for the actual application of sanctions.
In order to ensure that breaches are actually prosecuted and ensure convergence for sanctions handed down, we require supervisors to put in place whistle blowing programmes to improve detection of violations, and propose convergence on the factors to be taken into account when imposing sanctions in each individual case.
Prosecution is highly case specific and in the realm of national authorities (with the exception of Credit Rating Agencies), so the reach of EU legislative action is limited. Therefore, peer reviews conducted by the ESAs (Art 30(2)(d) of the ESA Regulations explicitly refers to sanctions) are an important tool to ensure further convergence, and once the legislative framework in all Member States on what supervisors can do will have converged following our initiative, we place big hopes on them.
What has happened to the initial idea of criminal sanctions?
Criminal sanctions can have an important deterrent effect in particular on individuals, and can therefore be appropriate in certain instances. Under Art 83(2) TFEU, the EU can take action on criminal sanctions but only under limited circumstances. We will further assess whether EU action on criminal sanctions is necessary for the financial services area as a whole and will decide about appropriate further action on that basis.
List of violations for which sanctioning powers should be available:
unauthorised banking services;
requirements to notify authorities in case of acquisition of qualifying holdings;
reporting requirements on capital, liquidity, leverage, large exposure;
limits on large exposures;
retention requirements on securitisation;
general liquidity coverage requirements;
public disclosure requirements (Basel Pillar III);
anti-money laundering requirements.
payments of remuneration or dividends in cases prohibited by CRD/CRR.
requirements for members of the management board (in particular limits on multiple board memberships)
14. RELIANCE ON RATINGS.
What is the issue?
Capital requirements are meant to be risk-sensitive and therefore require measures of credit risk as inputs. Such measures can either be developed by each bank itself or by a specialised institution whose job is to evaluate risk (credit rating agencies - CRAs).
The financial crisis highlighted that banks had taken on risk without really understanding it and that they relied too much on the risk assessments of external rating agencies, of which there are only a few. Once the crisis started, many of the risk assessments in the securitisation field proved to be wrong. Rating agencies then adapted their risk assessments as a result of which banks tried to exit the markets in question at the same time. This adjustment, while desirable, was so violent that it undermined financial stability.
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) endorsed in October 2018 principles to reduce authorities’ and financial institutions’ reliance on CRA ratings in standards, law and regulation. The G20 approved the FSB's principles on reducing reliance on external credit ratings (Seoul Summit, 11‑12 November 2018).
The FSB principles cover five types of financial market activity: 1) prudential supervision of banks; 2) policies of investment managers and institutional investors; 3) central bank operations; 4) private sector margin requirements; and 5) disclosure requirements for issuers of securities. The goal of the principles is to reduce the cliff effects from CRA ratings that can amplify procyclicality and cause systemic disruption. The principles call on authorities to do this through:
removing or replacing references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations, wherever possible, with suitable alternative standards of creditworthiness assessment;
expecting that banks, market participants and institutional investors make their own credit assessments, and not rely solely or mechanically on CRA ratings.
The FSB is currently conducting a peer review in order to tack stock of the progress of FSB Members in implementing the principles mentioned above.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is working toward achieving compliance with the G20 and FSB objectives of reducing mechanistic reliance on external ratings, focusing first on the securitisation framework, where such reliance is predominant. It has also proposed to reduce reliance on credit rating agencies ratings in the regulatory capital framework.
How does the new framework reduce over-reliance on external ratings?
This problem has two facets. First, and from a general view point, when it comes to estimating the risk of instruments and activities. Second, when it comes to calculating the amount of regulatory capital.
As regards the first, institutions need to understand the risks of the activities they undertake. However convenient, they should not outsource that judgement fully to an external party such as a credit rating agency. The most problematic overreliance on ratings takes place when institutions invest in rated securities without understanding the risks of these securities. Misguided investment decisions may create bubbles. The most blatant case of such overreliance, in the field of securitisation, has already been addressed by CRD II, which required institutions to carry out a range of analysis for their securitisation investments, even if they are AAA rated.
On top of that, credit institutions and investment firms are required to have their own sound credit granting criteria and credit decision processes in place. This applies irrespective of whether institutions grant loans to customers or whether they incur securitisation exposures. External credit ratings may be used as one factor among others in this process but shall not prevail. In particular, internal methodologies shall not rely solely or mechanistically on external ratings.
As regards the role of ratings in calculating the amount of regulatory capital, avoiding overreliance in this field does not mean making no references to ratings whatsoever. Such references may sometimes be the best available alternative. The systems that are necessary to produce internal ratings are not only costly to implement but also to supervise. Moreover, developing internal ratings may sometimes be impossible for an institution in isolation (e. g. when an institution only has a few material counterparties).
The new rules therefore require institutions that have a material number of exposures in a given portfolio to develop internal ratings for that portfolio. This expresses the EU's preference for using internal rather than external ratings where possible. The new framework will also require institutions using external ratings to benchmark the resulting capital requirements to their internal credit opinions. If that comparison shows that the capital requirements are too favourable compared to the internal credit opinion, then the institution will be required under Pillar 2 to hold additional capital.
In addition, the EBA should every two years publish information on what banks and supervisors have done to reduce overreliance on external ratings and report on the degree of supervisory convergence in this regard.
Why does the EU go for a half-measure; would it not be better to prohibit any reliance on external ratings as done by the US?
Risk sensitive capital requirements require a measure of credit risk. Sometimes external ratings – however imperfect – remain the best solution available. The alternatives (e. g. country based method for banks, internal ratings) may misguide markets, be too costly or lack objectivity.
Removing references to ratings without having alternatives in places could be counterproductive. The US example highlights the difficulty of eliminating ratings. Following the Dodd Frank Act, US authorities have been forced to delete any references to ratings in financial legislation, without having workable alternatives in place. To avoid this inconvenience the package aims to strengthen own credit risk assessments and reduce sole and mechanistic reliance on credit ratings.
Rather than scrapping ratings altogether, the new framework encourages the use of internal ratings and strengthens provisions on how external ratings can be used. Furthermore, the CRR introduces supervisory benchmarking to ensure a high level of quality of internal approaches to credit risk assessment.
According to the Regulation CRA III ( MEMO/13/571 ), by 31 December 2018, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on:
(a) the steps taken as regards the deletion of references to credit ratings which trigger or have the potential to trigger sole or mechanistic reliance thereon; و.
(b) alternative tools to enable investors to make their own credit risk assessment of issuers and of financial instruments,
with a view to deleting all references to credit ratings in Union law for regulatory purposes by 1 January 2020, subject to appropriate alternatives being identified and implemented.
15. OTHER ISSUES.
The new rules will strengthen banking regulation. Will that not encourage activity to migrate to the non-regulated “shadow banking” sector?
Banks are at the heart of the EU financial system. It is accordingly of vital importance that they are safe and sound. That is why the new framework involves an overhaul of EU banking legislation.
At the same time, it is important to ensure that, as a result of this, risk does not simply migrate to other less regulated areas of the financial system. While this is not a reason for refraining from raising the regulatory bar for banks, it is a strong reason for closely monitoring any potential migration. This is an international issue and work is currently on-going at the FSB on 'shadow banking', i. e. when banks are interconnected with non-regulated entities and when non-bank type of institutions provide banking-like services and functions. Two new measures are introduced in CRR to reduce the risks that shadow banking poses to banks:
banks will report to their supervisors the amounts of their main exposures to unregulated entities as well as exposures arising from repurchase agreements and securities lending transactions;
by the end of 2017 the European Banking Authority will prepare guidelines to limit banks’ exposure to unregulated financial counterparties, while the European Commission will be required to determine, by the end of 2018, whether it is appropriate to establish such limits by considering the work carried out at both European and international level, particularly by the Basel Committee.
The Commission strongly supports the G20-FSB's objectives of monitoring the shadow banking system and developing regulatory proposals. A Green Paper on shadow banking was released last year. For the time being important discussions are still on-going within the FSB working groups and the Commission is actively involved in the finalisation of the recommendations.
While the FSB will present its final policy recommendations for endorsement by the G20 in September 2018, the Commission intends to adopt a Communication on shadow banking in the coming weeks.
Will the new rules make trade finance more costly?
Trade finance and export credits are important financial instruments for EU export and contribute to growth and job creation.
Trade finance is not part of the Basel III agreement but following a specific G20 request the Basel Committee proposed in October 2018 two changes to reduce capital requirements in relation to trade finance: 1) using the actual maturity (> 1 day) of the trade exposure instead of a one year maturity floor, which will result in lower capital requirements and 2) waiving the 100% sovereign floor for short term exposures to banks in Low Income Countries that are unrated (and apply instead the favourable approach for unrated banks). The new framework transposes both measures into EU legislation (see Article 162 and Article 121 of CRR).
A more favourable treatment in terms of capital charges will also be introduced in relation to certain trade finance instruments (tender and performance guarantees) through a reduction of their ‘exposure value’ as a result of changing their ranking in the CRR classification of off-balance sheet items (see Annex I to CRR).
The new liquidity rules should not make the provision of trade finance more expensive. On the contrary, the reporting requirements for liquidity outflows for trade-finance off balance sheet related products are subject to a maximum outflow of 5 per cent, in line with the Basel III requirements. However, national competent authorities may apply a lower outflow percentage. In addition, as part of the observation period, the EBA shall report to the Commission, among others, on whether the LCR has a material detrimental impact on trade financing, including lending under official export credit insurance schemes.
What is proposed to increase banks' lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to help EU economic recovery?
SMEs are one of the pillars of the European economy given the fundamental role they play in providing employment and creating economic growth.
Taking into account the limited amount of alternative sources of funding, in order to ensure an appropriate flow of credit to SMEs in the current difficult economic context, Article 501 of CRR introduces a reduction in the capital charges for exposures to SMEs – up to EUR 1.5 million - through the application of a supporting factor equal to 0.7619, thus providing credit institutions with an appropriate incentive to increase the available credit to EU SMEs. To achieve this objective credit institution should effectively use the capital relief produced through the application of the supporting factor for the exclusive purpose of easing lending conditions for EU SMEs and provide an adequate flow of credit to the real economy.
Supervisory Authorities will monitor periodically the amount of exposures to SMEs of credit institutions in relation to the total amount of capital deduction and other factors including the developments in the economic cycle.
After 3 years from the date of application the CRR, i. e. by 2017, the Commission will have to report on the impact of the supporting factor on lending to small and medium-sized enterprises and shall submit this report to the European Parliament and the Council, and, if appropriate, a legislative proposal.
You propose to continue considering sovereign debt as risk free. Isn't the risk of such debt amply illustrated by current events in the euro area?
The CRR and CRD aim at a risk-sensitive treatment of all exposures, including those to central governments. However this should be achieved by instruments which go beyond risk weights for credit risk. The legislation stresses that banks and investment firms should address and control all concentration risks, including from public sector exposures. Given the size of these exposures that banks hold for various reasons, including liquidity risk management, addressing concentration risk is key and more effective than risk weighting them, as risk weights are typically calibrated to absorb losses on a well-diversified portfolio of small exposures.
The difficulties with risk weights for central government exposures are recognised both in the CRR and in the Basel Accord by allowing exemptions from risk weighting (i. e. risk weights of zero) for domestic, and in our case, European, central government exposures.
What will the impact on the real economy of the new rules be?
Results of the Commission's impact assessment indicate that the impact of the proposed measures in the whole EU will be by far lower than the estimates presented by the industry (as they typically consider only costs, but no benefits). In our view, the concerns expressed by the industry about an excessive impact of the reform on banks’ lending and the economy are therefore exaggerated.
More importantly, the transition period to the new capital and liquidity requirements is very generous. This will allow institutions to reach the new targets in an organic way, without putting a lot of pressure on capital markets. It will also reduce the impact of the nominal credit shock on the real economy (via price adjustments).
How do the new rules relate to the bank resolution legislative proposal?
The two frameworks complement each other. The CRDIV/CRR package strengthens the prudential requirements and supervision related to banks and investment firms. The legislative proposal on bank resolution contains measures on how to address a banking crisis at an early stage and if the crisis develops further resolve a failing bank in an orderly manner without damaging the financial system and by extension, the real economy. While the CRD IV/CRR package reduces the probability of banks failing, the proposal reduces the impact of such failures and will therefore work as a backstop for bank failures. It contains legislative provisions related to preparatory measures, early intervention measures and resolution powers and tools.
How will the common rule book contribute to the establishment of a Banking Union?
CRDIV is the backbone of the single rule book and, together with harmonized deposit protection schemes (see IP/10/918 ) and a European recovery and resolution framework (see IP/12/570 and IP/13/674 ), they form the core components of a stronger financial framework common to the 28 Member States (see MEMO/13/679 ) .
Building on this stronger regulatory framework, the European Commission has taken an inclusive approach by proposing a roadmap for the Banking Union. It includes a number of steps for the 18 Euro Area Member States, and potentially also open to all 28 Member States should they wish to participate. Two major steps have been taken with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (see IP/12/953 ) and the Single Resolution mechanism (see IP/13/674 and MEMO/13/675 ) .
What’s the interaction between the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the CRDIV/CRR on the use of macro-prudential tools?
The CRD/CRR package defines the macro-prudential toolkit, rules and procedures to be applied by the relevant authorities in all Member States.
Article 4a of the draft SSM regulation as reflected in the agreement reached between the European Parliament and the Council on 19 March 2018 allows: 1) national competent or designated authorities to act on own initiative to apply macro-prudential tools; 2) the ECB to impose higher requirements or to act in consultation with the relevant competent authority in each participating Member State; 3) a reciprocal consultation process to ensure that both the national authorities and the ECB act in a consistent and coordinated manner.
In any event, the allocation of the competence to exercise macro-prudential tools between the ECB and national authorities in the SSM are fully consistent with the coordination procedures provided for in the CRD/CRR texts which will apply to all 28 Member States. As consistently defended by the Commission, prior coordination procedures for macro-prudential action are necessary to avoid negative spill-over effects on other Member States and to safeguard the internal market.
What are the new rules for the exposures in defaults?
For banks using the internal rating based approach for credit risk, the Regulation allows competent authorities to replace the 90 days with 180 days for exposures secured by residential or SME commercial real estate in the retail exposure class, as well as exposures to public sector entities (PSEs). The 180 days shall not apply for the purposes of standardised approach.
Key Numbers mentioned in the 2018 Impact Assessment.
Process and public consultations:
One public hearing and four online public consultations between 2009-2018,
Nearly 300 responses to online consultations,
EU quantitative impact study on a sample of 246 banks holding 70% of capital of the whole EU banking sector.
Crisis-related losses incurred by European banks between 2007 and 2018: almost €1 trillion or 8% of EU GDP (IMF)
EU GDP contraction in 2009 due to the economic recession induced by the financial crisis: 6% (Eurostat)
Approved state aid measures between October 2008 and October 2018: €4.6 trillion or 39% of EU GDP (Commission)
State aid measures effectively used in 2008 and 2009: more than €2 trillion (Commission)
Examples of companies where inadequate management of liquidity risk largely contributed to their failure: Northern Rock (UK), HBOS (UK), Bradford and Bingley (UK), Bear Sterns (US), Lehman Brothers (US)
Examples of companies whose (mostly hybrid) capital instruments did not live up to the expectations as regards their loss absorption, permanence and flexibility of payments capacity (which had to be reinforced through Commission state aid decisions): RBS (UK), Bradford and Bingley (UK), KBC Group (BE), Bayern LB (DE), Commerzbank (DE), Lloyds (UK), Allied Irish Banks (IR), Bank of Ireland (IR), Cajasur (ES)
Short term impact, ignoring benefits of the new measures:
Estimated Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) shortfall to meet the new minimum requirements and the conservation capital buffer, based on 2009 capitalisation levels:
Immaterial in 2018 (binding only for 3 banks in the EU QIS sample) – due to transitional provisions;
€84 billion in 2018 – due to transitional provisions;
€460 billion in 2019 – full implementation.
Limited impacts till 2019(after this period a superior increase in EU GDP is expected, please refer to the figures below):
Decrease of only 0.14%-0.17% in EU GDP for each percentage point increase in CET1 capital ratio (Basel Committee, Commission services)
Decrease of only 0.42%-0.49% in EU GDP for the above €460 billion CET1 capital shortfall (Basel Committee, Commission services)
Long-term economic impact (after 2019), considering both benefits and costs of the new measures:
Average decrease of only 1.8% in stock of loans for 2020-2030 (Commission services)
On Average an increase of only 0.29 percentage points in loan rates for 2020-2030 (Commission services)
Net economic benefits (i. e., benefits less costs) increase of 0.3% - 2% in EU GDP, stemming from reduction in expected frequency of systemic banking crises (Basel Committee, Commission services)
Reduction in the probability of systemic banking crises: within the range of 29% to 89% when banks recapitalise to a total capital ratio (including buffers) of at least 10.5% (Commission services, Basel)
Additional systemic benefits in terms of stemmed pro-cyclicality and reduced severity of any future banking crises not captured in the above estimates.
According to the IMF estimates, crisis-related losses incurred by European banks between 2007 and 2018 are close to €1 trillion or 8% of the EU GDP.
Regulation (EU) No 575/2018 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2018 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2018 published in the Official Journal of the European Union L 176, volume 56, of 27 th June 2018.
Directive 2018/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2018 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC published in the Official Journal of the European Union L 176, volume 56, of 27 th June 2018.
See Article 521 of CRR and Article 162 of CRDIV.
A CCP is an entity that interposes itself between the two counterparties to a transaction, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. A CCP's main purpose is to manage the risk that could arise if one counterparty is not able to make the required payments when they are due – i. e. defaults on the deal.
The principles set out in CRD III were in line with the internationally agreed and endorsed Financial Stability Board (FSB) Principles and Standards for Sound Compensation Practices and the principles regarding sound remuneration policies set out in the Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (OJ L 120, 15.5.2009, p. 22).
See Article 22 and points 23 and 24 of Annex V of Directive 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006, as amended by, among others, Directive 2018/76/EU of 24 November 2018.
Article 145 of Directive 2006/48/EC.
It is recalled in this context that CRD IV repeals Directive 2006/48/EC together with its successive amendments.

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Managing risks to banks and financial institutions.
Prudential requirements.
EU rules on prudential requirements aim to make the financial sector more stable while ensuring it can support the economy.
Bank recovery and resolution.
The EU provides a framework for authorities to manage bank failures effectively.
Deposit guarantee schemes.
EU legislation protects bank deposits in the case of bank failure.
Structural reform of the EU banking sector.
Information on the European Commission's proposal on banking structural reform, which aims to strengthen the stability of the largest banks.
Winding-up of credit institutions.
A single bankruptcy procedure can be applied to credit institutions in all EU countries.
Regulating credit rating agencies.
In the wake of the financial crisis, the EU adopted rules on credit rating agencies to restore market confidence and increase investor protection.
Prudential rules for investment firms.
Many of the prudential requirements applicable to banks also apply to investment firms. The EU is considering if these rules are appropriate for investment firms, or if a new, more targeted set of rules is needed.
Covered bonds.
The EU is working to integrate and improve the efficiency of the covered bonds market.